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Abstract: 
Parties in government face a decline in EP elections after experiencing a surge in votes to win 
the national election. This occurs because voters are more inclined to give voice to their 
dissatisfaction with current government performance by voting for the opposition or exiting 
because less is at stake in second‐order elections. These elections negatively affect the 
electoral fortunes of governing parties as voters opt to punish poorly performing national 
governments in EP elections. Meanwhile, greater reliance on the EU issue dimension in vote 
choice models is taken as evidence for the increasing Europeanisation of EP elections. We 
examine the role of the media in making the EU issue dimension salient in such a way that 
government parties may benefit electorally from this increased saliency. To examine whether 
visibility of government party actors in media coverage increases loyalty for the governing 
parties either directly or via priming the EU issues for voters, we combine survey data from 
the 2009 European Election Studies (EES) with data on news coverage of those elections that 
links the governing party to the EU issue. We show that where the government is visible in 
EU news coverage, EU issue voting tends to increase loyalty while decreasing the probability 
to vote for the opposition and thus improves the electoral prospects for governing parties. 
This is even more the case if the issue is primed by negative campaign coverage. 
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Introduction 
Research on the nexus between transnational and national politics, in this case between 
attitudes towards European integration and individual electoral behaviour in EU-member 
states, has mostly produced ‘negative’ results. ‘Europe’ is rarely a relevant issue – not in 
national elections or even in European Parliament elections (de Vreese et al, 2006; 
Schuck et al, 2011). This holds both for the behaviour of elites and the behaviour of the 
voters. Hence, EP elections are commonly described as second-order national elections 
(Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Marsh, 1998), with national issues dominating the electoral 
campaign and parties in government facing electoral losses. Voters in the second-order 
EP elections have the possibility to express their dissatisfaction with national politics by 
voting for opposition parties, also because less is at stake (Hix and Marsh, 2007). Recent 
evidence does not, overall, challenge this claim but has opened the window for some 
‘European’ potential. The ‘sleeping giant’ hypothesis (van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004), 
the work of Kriesi et al (2006, 2008), and more recently of de Vries (2007) and Hobolt et 
al (2009) suggest that the European issue is becoming relevant for electoral behaviour 
and, as a consequence, for electoral outcomes both at national and EP elections.  
Following and extending this line of research, we investigate whether and how the 
diffusion of the European dimension into the electoral arena reduces the competitive 
disadvantages of governing parties at EP elections, focusing on the role the news media 
play in potentially transforming EP elections into first-order affairs. An increased focus 
on EU issues may be advantageous for government parties as they enjoy a better 
reputation regarding EU issues and are ascribed higher competence concerning them, 
compared to opposition parties, in the sense that they can deliver on the EU issue. 
Furthermore, the moment EU issues gain more media attention and thus become more 
salient in the mind of citizens, governments may suffer less from protest voting caused by 
national politics, which has been induced by EP electoral campaigns in the past. The 
likelihood of expressing dissatisfaction with national politics by punishing government 
parties in EP elections decreases the more citizens base evaluations of national political 
actors on EU level issues. Therefore, a decrease in the losses of governing parties in EP 
elections could follow in the case EP elections no longer qualify as second-order 
elections and show increased independence from heuristics based on the national political 
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context. In this paper, we examine how voters who have supported a government party in 
the previous national election are affected by the news media in their voting decisions at 
EP elections.  
To test the above claim we make use of an extensive data collection effort that took place 
right before and after the EP elections of 2009. More than just a straightforward voter 
survey, the European Election Study of 2009 also gathered data on media content during 
the three weeks of the campaign in all of the then 27 member states. Here we combine the 
Voter Study and data drawn from the Media Content Analysis to provide a test of 
whether news media reporting on European integration can improve the fate of 
government parties in second-order elections. Our findings suggest that news media tend 
to condition electoral behaviour in such a way that as media coverage of EU related 
issues linked to government parties increases, these issues tend to matter more for 
individual voting decisions, and the competitive disadvantage of parties in government in 
EP elections is reduced.  
We proceed as follows: we first review the literature on European issue voting as well as 
media priming and set out our theoretical and empirical expectations. A concise 
discussion of the data, methods and the results of our models is presented in the second 
section. We conclude the paper with a discussion of our findings and some implications 
for European issue voting and the nature of EP elections. 
 
Information, Media Priming, and Government Evaluations  
European parliamentary elections have been characterized as second-order national 
elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). This implies three particular characteristics of EP 
election campaigns: low campaign intensity; national, not European, issues on the 
agenda; and electoral defeats of government parties. First, the second-order theory of EP 
elections hypothesises that the turnout difference between EU and national elections is 
due to the lack of mobilization in EU elections. Because “less is at stake” in EU elections, 
parties are less likely to mobilize voters, the media do not cover the campaigns and 
turnout will be lower than in national campaigns. Second, the issue agenda during 
European election campaigns is dominated by national issues and not European ones. 
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European issues are not a relevant category in the citizens’ party choices. And third, 
government parties lose vote shares as the EP elections are about national issues and 
voters have the possibility to express their dissatisfaction with the performance of 
governing parties. 
These government losses are at the core of our analysis. Similar in result to what 
Campbell (1960) called ‘surge and decline’ in the US context, parties in government tend 
to suffer in second-order elections by losing a significant number of voters who 
supported them in the last first-order election (Hix and Marsh, 2011: 8). Deviant 
behaviour in EP elections can come in two shapes: Borrowing terms from Hirschman 
(1970) – and similar to a study by Weber (2011) but with a less complex adaption – we 
can distinguish former supporters who express dissatisfaction through ‘voice’, i.e. by 
vote-switching to opposition parties, or those who express dissatisfaction by exiting the 
electoral process (i.e. abstaining). The third option is showing loyalty, which is 
represented by voting again for the previously endorsed party in government. Regarding 
electoral competition, voice is the most harmful option for ruling parties while the 
harmfulness of exit depends more on the overall mobilization levels. Differentiating 
between both forms of disloyalty does not only help us to determine the harmfulness, it 
also speaks to more refined perspectives on second-order elections located on the micro-
level which link turnout and party choice to determine and explain vote share differences 
(e.g., Rohrschneider and Clark, 2008; Weber, 2011; Giebler, 2014; Giebler and Wagner, 
2015; Boomgaarden et al, 2016).      
If it is true, as many studies suggest, that opting for exit or voice becomes more viable in 
a second-order context, we would expect comparatively more loyalty in EP elections as 
soon as they become less dependent on the national political arena. Waking the ‘sleeping 
giant’ – increasing the relevance of EU issues for electoral behaviour – is one way to 
diminish the second-orderness of EP elections. While Mair (2000) and others (see e.g., 
Krouwel, 2004) have suggested little impact of Europe on citizens’ electoral behaviour, 
there is recent evidence of some electoral Europeanisation.
1
 European issues are gaining 
in importance in the formation of voter preferences. The influence of Europe on voting 
                                                 
1
 On Europeanisation in general see e.g. Hooghe and Marks, 2009.  
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behaviour has been labelled as “EU issue voting”, meaning preferences on European 
integration and closeness to political parties on this issue structure vote choice. A small 
group of studies has presented empirical evidence in support of the EU issue voting 
hypothesis (Evans, 1998, 2002; Gabel, 2000; Tillman, 2004; de Vries, 2007; Hobolt et al, 
2009).
2
 EU issue voting is dependent on the political context and it is found in cases 
where the issue is more salient and where there is partisan conflict over European 
integration due to coalitional and electoral incentives for parties to emphasise this issue 
(de Vries, 2007; Hooghe and Marks, 2009; de Vries et al, 2011; Green-Pedersen, 2012).  
Our interest in this paper is how higher EU saliency in the news media translates into EU 
issue voting for government parties at EP elections. In general, most political information 
is transferred via news media (e.g., Delli Carpini, 2004). News media are expected to 
exert particular influence once they deal with issues that are not directly connected with 
citizens’ daily experiences, and voters can only learn about from the news media (Page 
and Shapiro, 1992). These considerations apply to EP elections and EU issues. News 
media are thus one of the main actors responsible for raising awareness and saliency of 
Europe in general and of EP elections in particular, and for transmitting evaluations on 
Europe. As Semetko and de Vreese state, news media provide “cues for citizens’ 
perception of the EU” (2004: 34).  
News media, however, dedicate varying degrees of salience to issues and actors. This 
applies also to the EU issue, which can be presented in connection with different political 
actors by the news media. Given the established patterns of news coverage by the media, 
governing parties have greater possibilities of being linked to EU issues as they generally 
enjoy higher degrees of media attention and can, to a larger extent, display their policy 
actions (e.g., Norpoth, 1992; Bawn and Somer‐Topcu, 2012). Furthermore, as Paper 2 
(part of this special issue) discusses, not all parties are considered equally competent on 
all issues, and parties which the media frame as competent on an issue might benefit from 
it, especially if that particular issue becomes salient in the election. As a result, that party 
should have a particular competitive advantage.  
                                                 
2
 Specific EU-level policies such as policies on the monetary union have also been found to influence 
voting behaviour in national elections (Scheve, 1999). 
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We apply this reasoning to the issue of European integration and argue that if the EU 
issue becomes more salient, the government parties should have a competitive advantage. 
As they represent the country’s interest on the European level, the competence framing 
should work to their advantage. As Hix and Marsh indeed state: “[…] if the election is 
mainly about Europe rather than national concerns […] we would not expect government 
parties to lose more votes than opposition [or extreme] parties” (2007: 498). Hence, 
linking that citizens obtain information from news media to the government bias in terms 
of media coverage and to the incumbent parties’ competitive advantage on EU issues, an 
increase in EU messages might be most effective for governing parties. Following the 
second-order literature, we argue that the losses government parties experience at EP 
elections are likely to decrease, the more information about the European issue linked to 
government parties is available in EP electoral campaigns. In other words, governments 
will lose fewer votes, both in terms of exit (abstention) and voice (vote-switching to the 
opposition). This leads to our baseline visibility hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: Overall, greater visibility of governing parties in news 
media coverage on Europe increases the probability of staying loyal by 
voting again for the governing party/governing coalition in EP elections.  
Citizens respond to the wider information environment in terms of updating information 
on the placement of party positions on European integration (Adams et al, 2011; 
Banducci et al, 2015). Electoral outcomes can then depend on the distribution of 
preferences on EU issues, as citizens’ voting calculus might be primed by the saliency on 
this new issue. Indeed, Ferrara and Weishaupt (2004) have argued that parties gaining 
salience on EU issues can increase their vote share in EP elections. These findings 
suggest that if the EU issue is being primed for voters, it might affect voting behaviour. 
Evidence of media priming would be present when, for example, the news media’s 
attention leads to that issue being weighted more heavily in evaluations of party leaders 
or political actors. In general, priming effects, based on accessibility models of 
information processing, occur when citizens change the basis of political judgements in 
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such a way that some criteria gain greater prominence in the judgment (e.g., Iyengar and 
Kinder, 1987; Iyengar, 1990).
3
  
Hitherto, the second-order literature suggests that given the low level of actual 
information on the EU, evaluations of the governing parties on national issues drive 
electoral behaviour in EP election. As information increases, for one, evaluations of EU 
issues might become more important in determining voters’ electoral decisions, for 
another, voters use EP elections to a lesser degree to express their dissatisfaction with 
governing parties. In other words, there will be less protest voting against governing 
parties, and more EU issue voting in favour of incumbents. Hence, in a second step, we 
explore whether the news media EU coverage can prime citizens’ attitudes towards the 
European issue in such a way as to elevate its saliency in the voting calculus, benefitting 
voting decisions in favour of government parties as the dominance of national issues is 
reduced.
4
 Based on the EU issue voting and the priming literature, we overall expect that 
when European issues are featured more prominently in the news, the proximity of the 
respondent to the party on European integration will be more influential in predicting the 
vote choice. We argue that where the governing parties are salient in EU related 
coverage, the EU issue carries more weight in an individual’s vote calculus. Therefore, 
we explore the priming hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: The more the EU issue is linked to parties in government in 
the news media EU coverage, the greater the influence of citizens’ 
proximity on the EU dimension will be in determining citizens’ loyal vote.  
                                                 
3
 Price and Tewksbury (1997: 197) characterise the process of media priming in the following way: “First, 
a media message renders one or another construct applicable, and that construct – say unemployment – is 
activated. By virtue of its activation, and in direct proportion to the recency and frequency of its activation, 
that construct remains temporarily accessible. […] Subsequently, when a person is called on to evaluate the 
performance of the president, unemployment is likely to be evaluated.” (1997: 197) 
4
 We note here two caveats stemming from previous research on priming. First, we observe that it is 
difficult to distinguish between priming and learning. Evidence that can be interpreted as priming might 
also be voters learning the positions of their preferred parties and adopting similar positions (Lenz, 2009, 
2012). Tesler (2014) provides evidence that priming better explains the process of linking salient issues to 
preferences for long held predispositions, while learning about party positions explains how issues salient 
in a campaign can influence preferences for newer issues. While it is not our intent to disentangle whether 
projection or priming is at work, we note the possibility that where government parties are willing to stake 
out their EU position in an election campaign (and hence gain greater news media coverage on that 
position), voters may be learning about that position and adopting similar positions.   
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In terms of both the direct and priming effects of news media, we consider valence. The 
evaluative tone of the coverage about government actors is expected to influence the 
effect of the media coverage (Sheafer, 2007). In agenda setting studies, a positive tone 
reduces the saliency attached to an issue (Schoenbach and Semetko, 1992). This finding 
is consistent with more recent research suggesting that negative information is better at 
capturing attention (Mutz, 1998; Marcus et al, 2000). Hence, we formulate the following 
valence hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Where the tone of EU coverage linked to governing parties 
is negative, the direct and the priming impact of visibility of government 
actors on staying loyal with governing parties in EP elections will be 
greater.  
 
Data and Methods 
In this section, we present our empirical measures and methods of capturing the visibility 
of government actors in stories about the EU. To test our hypotheses, we rely on data 
from the European Election Study 2009 (PIREDEU).
5 
The post-election survey of 2009 
was carried out immediately after the election in June 2009. A media content analysis 
based on campaign news coverage leading up to the EP election is used to provide a 
direct measure of the amount of electorally relevant information. Over a three-week 
period, the content analysis was carried out on a sample of national news media coverage 
in all 27 EU member states (comprised of broadsheets, tabloids, public and commercial 
broadcasts).
6 
The overall television sample consists of 58 TV networks and the overall 
newspaper sample includes 84 different newspapers.
7 
  
As we are interested in exploring the determinants of reducing the competitive 
disadvantage of governing parties in second-order EP election, we measure vote choice 
for incumbents in EP elections relative to voters’ electoral decision in the previous 
                                                 
5
 Data collection for post-election survey and media content analysis was carried out under the auspices of 
‘Providing an Infrastructure for Research on Electoral Democracy in the European Union’ (PIREDEU): 
van Egmond et al, 2013; Schuck et al, 2010. 
6
 We focus on national television and newspapers because these media are consistently listed as the most 
important sources of information about the EU for citizens in Europe (Eurobarometer 54–62). 
7
 The list of outlets as well as more information on the coding can be found in Schuck et al, 2011. 
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national election. Following Hirschman’s framework (1970), we use the recall question 
to establish whether a voter has remained loyal to the previously endorsed governing 
party, whether she voiced support for an opposition party, or has exited the political 
system by abstaining.
8
 Respondents who voted for an opposition party or abstained in the 
previous national election were excluded from the analyses.  
The distribution of voters for incumbents in the previous national elections in the EP 
election 2009 is as follows. While a majority of government voters (57 per cent) also 
supported the incumbent in the EP election, 26 per cent of former government voters 
abstained and 17 per cent voiced support for an opposition party.
9
  
The three core variables to test our hypotheses are the EU integration issue proximity, the 
governments’ media hits – stories about the EU referring to the government or parties in 
government – and the tone of these media hits. Proximity on EU integration is measured 
in the common way using the respondents’ self-positioning as well as the ascribed party 
positions on 11-point scales. We calculated the proximity of a respondent’s position to 
the government’s position. The latter is defined as the weighted mean of all parties in 
government with weighting being done on the basis of vote shares at the last national 
election.  
To measure the government specific information available in the news environments, we 
focus on news stories from the media content analysis that mention the EU. Within each 
story, we code whether the parties in government, parties in opposition or other actors 
appear in the story.
10
 Our measure of the information available linked to the government 
in news stories is the proportion of all news stories mentioning the EU and the 
                                                 
8
 Though we are aware that recall questions are plagued by considerable errors (e.g., van der Eijk and 
Niemöller, 2008; Waldahl and Aardal, 2000), recent findings have indicated that measurement error in 
recall data has a limited impact on the validity of research findings (Dassonneville and Hooghe, 2016). 
9
 After applying listwise deletion regarding all variables used in this study, the proportions differ slightly: 
60 per cent stay loyal, 22 per cent exit (abstention) and 17 per cent give voice (vote for the opposition). The 
sample size drops from 9,700 to 5,934 respondents. However, these differences are unsystematic regarding 
the variables used in our analysis and, hence, should not affect our results. 
10
 Detailed information on coder training, coding procedures and related issues can be found in Schuck et al 
(2010). Inter-coder reliability is very high for the first step – identifying EU stories (Krippendorff’s Alpha 
= 0.8). It is much lower for the assignment of actor codes (0.45). However, taking into account the large 
number of different actors – several thousand codes were assigned – we see this as an acceptable value. 
Moreover, we collapse the data by only differentiating between government and opposition actors which 
makes any coding error within one of the groups unproblematic for our analysis.  
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government or parties in government of all stories on EU issues in a country. For 
example, if there were ten EU news stories for the day and two mentioned government 
party actors, our indicator of visibility is 20 per cent. In the original coding process, each 
news story was coded on a five-point scale representing negative, negative as well as 
positive, or a positive tone towards the actor.
11
 We calculated the average tone of all 
messages referring to the government and the EU.
12
  
Several other factors should influence the probability to vote for any of the parties in 
government in an EP election. Hence, we estimate a model where we include several 
control variables from the voter survey. We use a measure of party identification 
(measuring whether a respondent identifies with any of the parties in government), the 
proximity on the left-right dimension (calculated in the same way as the EU integration 
issue proximity), a binary measure on whether the respondent approves of the 
government’s record and a categorical measure on how the national economy has 
developed in the last 12 months (got worse, stayed the same and got better – the first 
constituting the base category in all models). Finally, following the argument about the 
role of the electoral cycle (Reif and Schmitt, 1980) which predicts that governing parties 
will lose the most votes in mid-term, we include a respective measure as well. All 
continuous independent variables have been standardized by dividing them by two 
standard deviations to make effect size comparable between all independent variables in 
the models (see Gelman, 2008).
13
 
To predict electoral behaviour in one of the three vote choice categories we run a 
multinomial logit model. To estimate multinomial logit models in a multi-level setup, we 
run a Generalized Structural Equation Model (GSEM). Such a hierarchical structure 
becomes necessary to estimate efficient standard errors and to control for correlated error 
terms while at the same time providing more information than a simple regression with 
                                                 
11
 A significant proportion of news stories does not provide any specific tone. We recoded these stories as 
having a neutral tone. Unfortunately, the documentation does not provide any information on inter-coder 
reliability for this variable.  
12
 For robustness checks we also differentiated between TV news and newspaper (e.g., Miller and 
Krosnick, 2000) when coding the proportion of media hits for government actors and the tone variable and 
we estimated separate models for both outlet types. In general, there are no important differences. 
However, we find the effects to be somewhat weaker when restricting the analysis to TV news.  
13
 An overview of all indicators used can be found in the appendix. 
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clustered standard errors.
14
 The GSEM accounts for non-independent errors and cluster-
specific intercepts identical to a regular random intercept multi-level model. Moreover, 
we used post-stratification weights on the level of respondents to balance different 
sampling procedures across the 27 member states and to ensure representativeness of our 
findings. To capture the priming effect of European issues, we use interaction terms 
between the issue proximity scale and the visibility, for the valence hypothesis we use a 
three-way interaction term including issue proximity, visibility and the tone of the EU 
coverage.  
 
Results 
We start with some descriptive statistics for our main variables. Figure 1 summarises the 
distributions as stacked bar graphs for our dependent variable. The proportions of survey 
respondents voting for the government in each country are shown as the light-grey 
section of the bars. There is a large variation between countries in the probability of 
voting for the governing party, ranging from around 20 per cent in the UK or Hungary 
and 80 per cent and more in, for example, Belgium, Malta or Italy. There is also huge 
variation how exit and voice are distributed between countries. Some differences can be 
explained by country characteristics. For example, compulsory voting leads to a smaller 
proportion of people abstaining – with the exception of Greece. Looking at Ireland and 
Slovakia, we see a more or less identical proportion of respondents staying loyal to the 
government, while the majority of remaining voters in Slovakia chose to abstain and the 
majority of Irish voters cast a ballot for the opposition. If we make the fair assumption 
that respondents’ characteristics are more or less equally distributed between countries 
and keeping in mind that differences between electoral systems applied in EP elections 
are rather moderate, there is a good chance that country-specific characteristics, such as 
news coverage, are able to account for some of these differences.
15 
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 The GSEM makes it necessary to restrict the number of estimated parameters. In this case, we followed 
the common approach to restrict the mean of the random intercepts to 1. 
15
 The expectation that country-specific characteristics can account for the variation in the dependent 
variable is also supported by an intra-class correlation of .16 at the country level.  
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Figure 1: Exit, Voice and Loyalty in the 2009 EP Elections 
 
Note: The stacked bar graph presents the share of respondents for each country for each of the three 
categories of our dependent variable (N = 9,700). Please note that the figure presents the weighted results 
before listwise deletion took place (see footnote 9). However, there are no relevant differences to the 
restricted sample after listwise deletion.  
 
Figure 2 presents the governments’ visibility as well as the average tone of these media 
hits in each country. Similar to our dependent variable, there is significant variation 
between countries. Some governments, for example in Finland or Lithuania, do not 
feature prominently in the media while others are rather dominant and, hence, highly 
visible (e.g., the UK, Ireland or Italy). Most of the governments are evaluated negatively 
in the news. There is no strong correlation between our measure of visibility and the 
measure of tone: as visibility increases, the tone becomes more negative but the 
correlation is far from significant even on the 10 per cent level.   
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Figure 2: Government Visibility and Tone of Coverage before the 2009 EP Elections 
 
Note: The scatter plots show the country level variation in the visibility of the governing parties in EU 
news using our constructed variable ‘media hits’ and the tone of these ‘media hits’. Visibility is the 
proportion of EU news stories that mention governing party actors (government media hits) of all EU news 
stories. Tone of media hits is the average tone in relation to governing actors in the EU news stories.   
 
Turning to our analytical models, we present ‘traditional’ regression tables in the 
appendix. For the purpose of comprehensibility, we chose to highlight our findings with a 
set of figures that are more appropriate for all hypotheses involving an interaction. 
However, we start with a look at our control variables including EU issue proximity. As 
all the following figures are designed in the same way, our explanation of the control 
variables’ results can be taken as a blue print for interpretation. Each figure presents 
marginal effects of a one-unit change of the independent variable measured as percentage 
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points if all other variables in the model are set to their empirical mean.
16
 As we have 
standardized the variables, we can compare the effect sizes directly (see above). 
Figure 3: Exit, voice and loyalty: the effects of control variables
17
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 Variables located on the country level are set to the mean of all 27 countries and not to the sample mean 
as this value would be distorted due to unequal sample sizes per country. 
17
 We present the results of a baseline model which only includes the controls and EU issue proximity 
(Model 1 in the Appendix). However, there are no relevant differences resulting from the addition of our 
variables of primary interest (see Appendix). 
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Note: Results of a multi-level GSEM with random-intercepts using post-stratification weights. Figures 
represent marginal effects of a one-unit change of the independent variable measured as percentage points 
if all other variables in the model are set to their empirical mean. The lines represent the 95% confidence 
intervals.  
 
In all remaining figures, we use different colours for each of the three outcomes: the 
results for exit are depicted in black, those for voice in dark-grey and those for loyalty in 
light-grey. Looking at the effects from top to bottom, we see that the evaluation of 
economic developments only shows a significant effect if one compares a positive to a 
negative evaluation (which is used as the base category). The probability of staying loyal 
– voting for the government party again in the EP elections – increases by close to seven 
per cent if the economy is evaluated positively, while the probability of losing voters to 
abstention decreases. There is no significant effect on ‘voice’, meaning losing voters to 
the opposition. Approval of a government’s record has the expected effect as it increases 
the probability to stay loyal while it decreases the probability of exit and voice. The same 
holds for PID for any of the parties in government. Not too surprisingly, this indicator has 
the largest effect in our model. Being close to a government’s weighted EU integration 
position results in remaining with the government and not in voting for the opposition. 
Interestingly, neither the left-right proximity nor the temporal location of the EP election 
in the national electoral cycle show any significant effect. However, as these variables are 
of no specific interest in this study, we refrain from speculating on the reasons behind this 
observation.  
Our first step is to examine the direct influence of government party visibility in the news 
in support for governing parties (H1). To test this unconditional hypothesis, we, in a first 
step, included all aforementioned independent variables – except the tone variable and 
the various interaction terms (Model 2 in the Appendix). To cut a long story short, there 
is no significant effect of visibility on the likelihood to reiterate a voter’s support for the 
governing parties in EP elections. Looking at the results for voiced support for opposition 
parties or abstention, we do also not see any significant effects. Hence, we have to reject 
Hypothesis 1: visibility of governing parties in the news media coverage on Europe does 
not increase the likelihood that voters will stick with their previously endorsed governing 
party, but it does also not provide any reason to switch or abstain. 
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Figure 4: EU issue proximity’s average marginal effect depending on visibility 
 
Note: Results of a multi-level GSEM with random-intercepts using post-stratification weights. Figures 
represent marginal effects of a one-unit change of the independent variable measured as percentage points 
if all other variables in the model are set to their empirical mean. The lines represent the 95% confidence 
intervals.  
 
In a second step, we analysed the first part of Hypothesis 3, namely the direct impact of 
visibility depending on the tone on vote choice (Model 4 in the Appendix). We have to 
conclude that visibility is still not affecting vote choice in EP elections: neither for 
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government vote nor opposition vote. There is also no effect on the probability to abstain. 
Hence, government visibility in news media does not directly affect vote choice. We thus 
have to reject also the first part of Hypothesis 3.
18
 As there is no support for any of our 
assumptions, we do not present any figures for the sake of saving space.  
Turning to our second hypothesis, we included an interaction of EU issue proximity and 
government visibility into the model (Model 3 in the Appendix). Figure 4 shows the EU 
issue proximity average marginal effect depending on the level of visibility along the 
three groups of respondents who voted for the government in the last national election. 
The effect is larger if visibility is high and there is no difference if visibility is low. With 
a visibility slightly above ‘medium’ – 40 percent plus of overall media hits referring to 
government actors – we get a positive effect for voting for the government and a negative 
one for switching to the opposition. However, we get a significant difference if the 
visibility is high. Hypothesis 2 is hence confirmed: EU issue voting is primed by news 
media’s EU coverage and it positively influences vote for the incumbent parties in EP 
elections where government visibility is high. Meanwhile, vote switching towards 
opposition parties decreases once EU issue voting is primed. While the electoral 
disadvantage of incumbents is reduced the more information on the EU is available, the 
electoral advantage of opposition parties is reduced, as national issues are less important 
in voters’ electoral choices. Priming also reduces the likelihood of exiting though this 
effect is not statistically significant.  
In the last model, we also include tone in our analysis. We used a three-way interaction 
(EU proximity x visibility x tone) to test the second part of Hypothesis 3 (Model 4 in the 
Appendix). In Figure 5, we show the EU issue proximity’s average marginal effect 
depending on the level of visibility as well as the tone. 
While we had to reject the first part of Hypothesis 3 with tone of the coverage having no 
effect on government’s visibility linked to the EU issue, for the second part, we find, as 
hypothesized, that the priming effect is indeed stronger if the tone is negative. We can 
thus partly confirm Hypothesis 3. Similar to the general priming effect, this only holds 
for medium or high visibility. Again, it reduces the electoral disadvantages of 
                                                 
18
 This also holds if we only specify a two-way interaction of visibility and tone.  
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government vote and it decreases voters’ likelihood to switch to opposition parties in EP 
elections, while having no effect on the probability to abstain. In other words, once 
negative information increases the salience of the European issue to a high level, 
government parties are less likely to experience vote losses in the sense of respondents 
giving voice in EP elections.  
Figure 5: EU issue proximity’s average marginal effect depending on visibility and tone  
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Note: Results of a multi-level GSEM with random-intercepts using post-stratification weights. Figures 
represent marginal effects of a one-unit change of the independent variable measured as percentage points 
if all other variables in the model are set to their empirical mean. The lines represent the 95% confidence 
intervals.  
 
While we had to reject the first part of Hypothesis 3 with tone of the coverage having no 
effect on government’s visibility linked to the EU issue, for the second part, we find, as 
hypothesized, that the priming effect is indeed stronger if the tone is negative. We can 
thus partly confirm Hypothesis 3. Similar to the general priming effect, this only holds 
for medium or high visibility. Again, it reduces the electoral disadvantages of 
government vote and it decreases voters’ likelihood to switch to opposition parties in EP 
elections, while having no effect on the probability to abstain. In other words, once 
negative information increases the salience of the European issue to a high level, 
government parties are less likely to experience vote losses in the sense of respondents 
giving voice in EP elections.  
In sum, our findings are mixed. There is no indication that visibility alone favours parties 
in government. Hence, Hypothesis 1 is rejected. There is, however, evidence that 
visibility has an indirect effect on vote choice in favour of staying loyal to government 
parties in the EP election as higher visibility linked to the government increases the 
importance of the EU issue proximity in determining vote choice for the governing party 
(Hypothesis 2). Negative tone and higher visibility result in a larger effect of EU issue 
voting and, therefore, we confirm Hypothesis 3 in part as well. As there is also no effect 
on visibility distinguishing a more negative and a more positive coverage, we also reject 
Hypothesis 3 in this regard. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Since Hooghe and Marks (2009) argued for a post-functionalist view of European 
integration, scholarly attention has been paid to the conditions under which political 
parties increase saliency for the issue of Europe strategically in the electoral context. Less 
focus has been placed on how the news media translate this saliency for voters and the 
impact it has on shaping preferences. In this paper, we have argued that saliency in the 
media, as indicated by governing parties being visible in stories about European 
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integration, serves to improve the performance of governing parties in these second-order 
contests. Therefore, we look at the electoral behaviour in the 2009 EP elections of those 
respondents in the then 27 member states that voted for the government in the last 
national election.  
One of the tenets of the second-order election literature is that EP elections are used to 
punish governing parties (Hix and Marsh, 2007). This can either be done by abstention 
(exit) or, more harmful for the national government, by voting for the opposition (voice).  
However, we argue that increased media coverage highlights the costs of using the EP 
election to punish governing parties. When European integration is made highly visibly 
and negatively salient in relation to governing parties, our results suggest that voters 
increase support for governing parties based on proximity on the issue of Europe. In other 
words, news media coverage can prime citizens’ EU-positions in such a way that they are 
more likely to be used to determine vote choice (in favour) of governing parties. Defined 
more broadly, the citizens’ calculus of EU issue voting is primed by the (negative and 
highly visible) news media EU coverage. Using Hirschman’s terminology, we see more 
loyalty to the government and, at the same time, a lower probability to voice discontent 
by voting for the opposition linked to EU issue voting under such circumstances.   
Our analysis points to several important conclusions for studying electoral behaviour in 
EP elections. In the context of ‘Europeanisation’ research, we go some way to suggest 
that the issue of European integration might have the potential to structure electoral 
behaviour particularly when the EU is a (highly) visible issue in the campaign and this is 
consistent with previous research (van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004; de Vries, 2007). 
Indeed, we present evidence that where the issue of Europe is salient in the media 
coverage, attitudes towards European integration tend to matter more in individual voting 
behaviour, and the electoral prospects for governing parties improve in EP elections 
reducing their voters’ likelihood to voice dissatisfaction by switching to an opposition 
party or abstaining altogether. Moreover, we conclude that visibility is important. 
However, visibility does not translate directly into electoral success but indirectly via 
political issues, which can be interpreted in both a valence, as well as a positional issue 
voting logic. 
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In line with the theme of this special issue, we show that when there is increased 
competition, as measured by the appearance of governing parties in EU stories, this can 
shape party competition. We have focused on governing parties, as one of the major 
tenets of the second-order theory of EP elections is that these elections adversely 
influence the performance of governing parties. However, more competition leads to 
larger coverage of EU issues and through that coverage (and subsequent individual 
exposure) individual EU positions are indeed primed in the minds of voters as we have 
demonstrated here. 
To sum up, we have explored a new perspective on how the European dimension can 
diffuse into the national arena and how increased competition can evoke citizens’ EU 
attitudes and policy positions in determining their party choice in EP elections. We 
uncovered an additional link in the chain that might lead to the awakening of the 
‘sleeping giant’ (van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996): That is the role of the media and its 
priming effect.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Variable descriptions 
 
Name Description 
Vote Choice in EP 
election 
Categorical measure; 2 = loyalty to the government party in EP 
election; 1 = voiced support for an opposition party in EP elections; 
0 = exit (abstention) in EP elections. 
Visibility 
Continuous measure; the visibility measure represents available 
media hits linked to the government in news stories. It is calculated 
as the proportion of all news stories mentioning the EU and the 
government or parties in government of all stories on EU issues in 
a country. Furthermore, separate measures of the proportion of 
media hits for government actors are calculated separately for TV 
news and newspapers. 
Tone 
Continuous measure of the average tone of all news stories on the 
EU featuring the government. The measure runs from -2 (very 
negative) to 2 (very positive). 
EU integration proximity 
Continuous measure of absolute proximity of the respondent’s 
position and government position on European integration. In case 
of a coalition government, we calculated the mean position of all 
parties in government while using vote shares at the most recent 
national election for weighting. The variable runs from 0 (positions 
are antagonistic) to 10 (identical position).   
Left-right proximity 
Continuous measure of absolute proximity of the respondent’s 
position and government position on the left-right scale. In case of 
a coalition government, we calculated the mean position of all 
parties in government while using vote shares at the most recent 
national election for weighting. The variable runs from 0 (positions 
are antagonistic) to 10 (identical position).   
PID for parties in 
government 
Binary measure of party identification for any party in government 
(1 = yes) 
Approval of government 
record 
Binary measure of approval of government record (1 = approval) 
 
Economic development Categorical measure based on the evaluation of sociotropic 
economic development in the past 12 months (1 = got much 
better/better; 2 = stayed the same; 3 = got worse/much worse) 
Electoral cycle 
Categorical measure; temporal position of the EP election in the 
national electoral cycle running from 0 (right at the middle of the 
electoral cycle) to 1 (EP election takes place on the same day as the 
national election). 
Note: Visibility and tone are based on the 2009 EES Media Study (Schuck et al, 2010). The vote shares 
used to calculate the weighted government positions are taken from various official election resources. All 
remaining variables are taken from the 2009 EES Voter Study (van Egmond et al, 2010). 
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Table A2: Explaining exit, voice and loyalty in the 2009 EP elections  
 
Outcome: EXIT vs 
LOYALTY 
Respondent level:  
N = 5,934 
Country level:  
N = 27 
Model 1: 
 Baseline model 
(without media 
variables) 
Model 2:  
Visibility  
Model 3: 
 Priming 
Model 4: 
 Tone 
         
Individual level         
EU integration proximity -0.13 
(0.11) 
 -0.13 
(0.09) 
 0.36 
(0.34) 
 0.34 
(0.39) 
 
Left-right proximity 0.06 
(0.12) 
- 
 0.06 
(0.12) 
 0.06 
(0.12) 
 0.07 
(0.12) 
 
PID for parties in 
government 
-1.21
(0.15) 
*** -1.21 
(0.15) 
*** -1.21 
(0.15) 
*** -1.22 
(0.15) 
*** 
Approval of government 
record 
-0.71 
(0.13) 
*** -0.71 
(0.12) 
*** -0.71 
(0.12) 
*** -0.72 
(0.11) 
*** 
Economic development 
(base category: got worse) 
        
     stayed the same -0.16 
(0.14) 
 -0.17 
(0.14) 
 -0.16 
(0.14) 
 -0.16 
(0.14) 
 
     got better -0.33 
(0.11) 
** -0.33 
(0.11) 
** -0.32 
(0.11) 
** -0.32 
(0.11) 
** 
Intercept 0.37 
(0.48) 
 -0.11 
(0.90) 
 
 -0.93 
(1.28) 
 -0.41 
(0.90) 
 
         
Country level         
Electoral Cycle 0.32 
(0.32) 
 0.33 
(0.31) 
 0.32 
(0.31) 
 0.20 
(0.28) 
 
Visibility 
 
  0.29 
(0.43) 
 0.80 
(0.67) 
 0.24 
(0.58) 
 
Tone 
 
      -0.13 
(3.22) 
 
         
Interactions         
2-way interactions         
EU integration proximity 
X Visibility 
    -0.31 
(0.21) 
 -0.23 
(0.28) 
 
EU integration proximity 
X Tone 
      0.27 
(0.97) 
 
Visibility X Tone       -0.50 
(1.87) 
 
3-way interaction         
EU integration proximity 
X Visibility X Tone 
      -0.04 
(0.59) 
 
                  Random part         
Error var., country level 0.44 
(0.16) 
** 0.42 
(0.16) 
** 0.43 
(0.16) 
** 0.36 
(0.15) 
** 
         
Note: All models are generalized structural equation models in a multinomial multi-level random intercept 
set-up and are estimated with Stata 14’s ‘svy: gsem’ command using post-stratification weights. We present 
logit coefficients with standard errors in brackets. The mean of the random intercepts is constrained to a 
value of 1.   
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
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Table A2: continued  
 
Outcome: VOICE vs 
LOYALTY 
Respondent level:  
N = 5,934 
Country level:  
N = 27 
Model 1: 
 Baseline model 
(without media 
variables) 
Model 2:  
Visibility  
Model 3: 
 Priming 
Model 4: 
 Tone 
         
Individual level         
EU integration proximity -0.37 
(0.14) 
* -0.37 
(0.14) 
* 0.38 
(0.43) 
 0.29 
(0.70) 
 
Left-right proximity 0.06 
(0.15) 
 0.05 
(0.16) 
 0.05 
(0.16) 
 0.04 
(0.16) 
 
PID for parties in 
government 
-2.10 
(0.19) 
*** -2.10 
(0.19) 
*** -2.10 
(0.19) 
*** -2.09 
(0.19) 
*** 
Approval of government 
record 
0.79 
(0.17) 
*** 0.78 
(0.17) 
*** 0.79 
(0.16) 
*** 0.79 
(0.16) 
*** 
Economic development 
(base category: got worse) 
        
     stayed the same 0.00 
(0.23) 
 0.00 
(0.23) 
 0.01 
(0.22) 
 0.00 
(0.22) 
 
     got better -0.27 
(0.17) 
 -0.27 
(0.18) 
 -0.26 
(0.18) 
 -0.27 
(0.17) 
 
Intercept 1.18 
(0.44) 
* 0.67 
(0.60) 
 -0.57 
(0.99) 
 -0.12 
(1.49) 
 
         
Country level         
Electoral Cycle -0.22 
(0.23) 
 -0.20 
(0.23) 
 -0.20 
(0.23) 
 -0.25 
(0.21) 
 
Visibility 
 
    1.06 
(0.57) 
 0.63 
(0.92) 
 
Tone 
 
      0.01 
(2.71) 
 
         
Interactions         
2-way interactions         
EU integration proximity 
X Visibility 
    -0.46 
(0.24) 
 -0.32 
(0.41) 
 
EU integration proximity 
X Tone 
      0.31 
(1.03) 
 
Visibility X Tone       -0.43 
(1.53) 
 
3-way interaction         
EU integration proximity 
X Visibility X Tone 
      -0.01 
(0.57) 
 
                  Random part         
Error var., country level 0.44 
(0.16) 
** 0.42 
(0.16) 
** 0.43 
(0.16) 
** 0.36 
(0.15) 
** 
         
Note: All models are generalized structural equation models in a multinomial multi-level random intercept 
set-up and are estimated with Stata 14’s ‘svy: gsem’ command using post-stratification weights. We present 
logit coefficients with standard errors in brackets. The mean of the random intercepts is constrained to a 
value of 1.   
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
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